Managing India's Nuclear Forces by Verghese Koithara

Author:Verghese Koithara [Koithara, Verghese]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Diplomacy, Arms Control, Political Science, World, Asian, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780815722670
Google: 5yNC-nWHqAQC
Goodreads: 16778887
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
Published: 2012-04-16T11:05:35+00:00

Independent review and monitoring agencies are helpful for all organisations that manage hazardous technology: they provide a form of devil's advocacy, prevent organisational blind spots from developing, help monitor the implementation of regulations, and reduce the temptation for organisations to be guided by narrow conceptions of self-interest (Sagan 1993: 269).

A major difficulty encountered in nuclear organisations is the need to reconcile high levels of secrecy with high levels of proficiency, effectiveness, and organisational compliance. One of the methods used to promote secrecy is to compartmentalise organisations, vertically and horizontally. This, however, has the effect of hindering learning by not allowing knowledge gained from human and technical failures to circulate through the system. Nuclear forces handle highly demanding technologies, procedures, and plans where failure modes are not adequately known, yet failures can create great danger. An unsophisticated approach to secrecy management can lead to grave consequences through organisational or human failure.

The aircraft component of India's nuclear force functions within a well established air force support system, but this is not the case with the missile component. The support system for the missile force has had to be built up from scratch, and this is not easily done for two reasons—the mobile basing of missiles, and the storage of missiles and warheads in different locations. Mobile basing places substantially greater responsibilities in the areas of logistics and security. Divided custody and crisis time coming together of warheads and delivery systems also place high demands. There are requirements of specialised facilities and equipment, air and road transportation, maintenance of systems and equipment, as well as provision of security in many locations and while on the move. Strike forces have to draw upon a large network of other units for planning and targeting, early warning and alerting, training, logistics, and security. This calls for high levels of co-ordination among the SFC and the three Services, under effective central direction. This is a major reason why the CDS is so important. There was near unanimous expectation in strategic circles that the creation of C-in-C SFC will force the creation of CDS to provide this central direction. But it did not happen for several reasons, possibly including the fact that the CDS, unlike the NSA, cannot instruct the DRDO and the AEC, which are not only in the command chain but also have custody of bombs and warheads.

There is a pressing need for India to better structure its nuclear organisations, and introduce sounder practices. Nuclear forces are very demanding entities. They call for effectively zero defect material environment and zero error organisational environment—not only in peacetime but also during the high stress conditions of crisis or actual war. Learning is required at technical, operational, and strategic levels. A wide range of competencies needs to be developed through both personal and institutional learning. The command system, of which nuclear forces are a part of, is as much a social system as it is a technical one. A strong organisational culture, with emphasis on continuous, structured and on-the-job

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